SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN NEW JERSEY LAW
In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents synopses of
recent New Jersey cases of interest to practitioners. In so doing, we
hope to assist the legal community in keeping abreast of some of the
more interesting changes in significant areas of practice.
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ARBITRATION AND AWARD-APPEARANCE OF PARTIALITY BY
To BE AVOIDED BY PRIOR DISCLOv.
Tri-County Asphalt Corp., 86
Inc.
Associates,
sup.E-Barcon
N.J. 179, 430 A.2d 214 (1981).
PARTY-DESIGNATED ARBITRATORS

Following a contract dispute, plaintiff Barcon Associates, Inc.,
brought suit against Tri-County Asphalt Corporation. Defendant
moved to stay the suit pending a tri-partite arbitration decision, and
the trial court obliged. In accordance with the contract, each party
designated one arbitrator and these two selected a third. 86 N.J. at
183, 430 A.2d at 216.
The arbitration panel decided two-to-one that Tri-County was to

pay Barcon $29,500. As provided by N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§ 2A:24-7 (West

Cum. Supp. 1980-1981), Barcon brought an action in the superior
court for confirmation of the award. 86 N.J. at 184, 430 A.2d at 216.
Tri-County counterclaimed to have the judgment vacated because
Barcon's designated arbitrator had exhibited "evident partiality and
misconduct." The trial court found that the arbitrator was partial,
and the appellate division affirmed. Id. at 185-86, 430 A.2d at 217.
The supreme court certified Barcon's petition. 84 N.J. 422, 420 A.2d
334 (1980). Underscoring the appellate division's concern that doing
business must be "open, aboveboard and candid," Justice Pashman
delivered the four to three decision affirming the lower courts and
vacating the arbitration award. 86 N.J. at 183, 430 A.2d at 215. The
court further required that all arbitrators, whether neutral or chosen
by a party, must disclose any previous relationships or transactions
with the parties or their representatives before arbitration proceedings. Such a disclosure would expose any facts which might lead a
reasonable person to believe that the arbitrator may have an interest
in the outcome of the proceedings. Id. at 192-93, 430 A.2d at 220-21.
Tri-County's counterclaim was based on two transactions which
were ongoing between Barcon and its designated arbitrator during the
deliberations of the panel. Specifically, Barcon owed the arbitrator's
firm $13,000 on one account, although he paid $43,005.78 on a
second account. Id. at 184-85, 430 A.2d at 216-17. Although no actual
partiality by Barcon's arbitrator was alleged, the ongoing transactions
and the presence of a substantial amount of money owed to the
arbitrator's firm by Barcon generated an "appearanceof partiality."
Id. at 191, 430 A.2d at 220 (emphasis in original).
Justice Pashman stressed that while the aim of arbitration is to
provide an expeditious resolution of disputes with minimal judicial
involvement, the function of the court is to preserve the integrity of
the arbitration process. The arbitration statute provides that awards
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shall be vacated by a court when "evident partiality or corruption"
exists, and no distinction is made between party-designated and neutral arbitrators. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24-8(b) (West 1952). To insure
that public confidence in the arbitration process is sustained, the
majority held that arbitrators must avoid actual partiality as well as
the appearance of partiality. 86 N.J. at 189, 430 A.2d at 219.
Vacating an arbitration award results in wasted time and money
for the parties involved. The court's requirement that full disclosure of
all potential conflicts of interest be made prior to the beginning of the
arbitration process is designed to reduce the possibility of such waste.
Information disclosed should include any relationship between the
parties and the arbitrator and any facts which show bias or interest in
the results of the arbitration. Id. at 192-93, 430 A.2d at 220-21.
A prior relationship between the arbitrator and the party designating him or her will not necessarily result in disqualification. Disclosure permits the parties to object if there is evidence of partiality
and to seek judicial resolution if required. Id. at 194, 430 A.2d at 221.
The court recognized that party-designated arbitrators "may be predisposed toward the party who appointed them," but stressed that all
arbitrators, whether party-designated or neutral, are charged with
the responsibility of remaining free of outside pressure that could
affect their decision. Id. at 190, 430 A.2d at 219 (quoting Holtzmann,
The First Code of Ethics for Arbitratorsin Commercial Disputes, 33
Bus. Law. 309, 319 (1977)).
Justice Clifford's dissent objected to the majority's disregard of
years of case law and protested what he deemed to be an unwarranted
intrusion into the practice of commercial arbitration. The dissent
declared that the majority was mistaken in relying upon Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145
(1968), to justify making the "appearance of partiality" the equivalent
of "evident partiality." 86 N.J. at 202, 430 A.2d at 226 (Clifford, J.,
dissenting). To support an attack on an arbitration award, there must
be misconduct by the arbitrator; simply an interest in the controversy
or in the party he or she represents will not sustain the challenge.
Justice Clifford claimed that authority requires only disclosure by
neutral arbitrators and that the majority's opinion effectively rewrites
the parties' contract. Id. at 204-13, 430 A.2d at 227-31 (Clifford, J.,
dissenting). Additionally, the dissent feared that bias will now be
permitted if, after disclosure, a party waives objection. Id. at 209, 430
A.2d at 229 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
The majority found the dissent's multiple criticisms unfounded.
It refused to limit its decision merely because some courts have only
required disclosure by neutral arbitrators. 86 N.J. at 189-91, 430 A.2d
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at 219-20. The majority's decision assures adherence to impartial
standards of decision-making, while the waiver rule acts as a procedural safeguard which prevents a party from withholding its objection
to a particular arbitrator until after the panel has decided against that
party. Id. at 196-99, 430 A.2d at 222-24.
For commercial arbitration to continue to fulfill its function in
conflict resolution, it must be free of the burden that bias can impose.
The arbitration proceeding is quasi-judicial in nature and arbitrators
are given extremely broad powers which are subject to only limited
judicial review. As recognized by the majority, the public interest
extends beyond the speedy resolution of disputes and requires assurance that arbitrators will not be rendered incapable by self-interest in
making an equitable decision.
A.W.H.

CIVIL PROCEDURE-TRUTH IN LENDING ACT STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DoES NOT BAR DEBTOR'S PECOUPMENT COUNTERCLAIM IN
ACTION BROUGHT BY CREDITOR TO RECOVER AMOUNT DuE-Beneficial Finance Co. v. Swaggerty, 86 N.J. 602, 432 A.2d 512
(1981).
In October 1974 defendant Theresa Taylor signed a promissory
note whereby she agreed to repay to Consumers Financial Services
(CFS) a loan of $750 over a three-year period at 23.68% interest. 86
N.J. at 605, 432 A.2d at 514. She made twenty-one of the monthly
payments until she defaulted in July 1976. CFS brought an action
against her to recover the balance due, and thereafter Taylor counterclaimed, alleging that CFS's practices violated the federal Truth in
Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1691 (1976), as CFS had
failed "to disclose 'clearly and conspicuously' the nature of the security
interest retained." 86 N.J. at 605, 432 A.2d at 514. The primary issue
was whether a debtor can assert the defense of recoupment under the
TILA to reduce liability in a suit brought by the creditor on the debt
even though an affirmative action for relief on the same claim would
be barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations.
At trial both parties moved for summary judgment, agreeing that
there was no factual dispute. Id. CFS admitted the TILA violation
but argued that the claim was barred by the one-year statute of
limitations. Id. The trial judge entered judgment for CFS and dismissed the counterclaim, reasoning that the statute of limitations was
substantive in nature and extinguished not only the right to bring such
claims, but also the remedy provided by the statute if an untimely
action is brought. Id. The appellate division affirmed, noting that
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recoupment was also unavailable because the counterclaim did not
arise from the same transaction as the claim for the debt. In reversing,
the New Jersey Supreme Court, in a six-to-one decision, held that a
TILA recoupment claim survives the one-year statute of limitations as
an affirmative defense to reduce a creditor's recovery. Id. at 606, 432
A.2d at 514.
Writing for the majority, Justice Pollock stated that the issue was
one of first impression in New Jersey and that there existed a split of
authority among the courts which had previously decided the issue.
Id. at 606-07, 432 A.2d at 514-15. He further stated that the decision
must be based upon federal common law, which determines when a
party may assert a defense arising from a federal statute. Id. at 607,
432 A.2d at 515. The majority concluded that under federal common
law the TILA one-year statute of limitations does not bar the defense
of recoupment so long as the main claim is timely. Id. at 606, 432
A.2d at 514. The court, therefore, had to determine whether a TILA
defense is a form of recoupment, an issue which the United States
Supreme Court had not yet specifically decided. Id. at 610, 432 A.2d
at 516.
Since recoupment is a defense that can only be used to extinguish
or reduce a plaintiff's recovery, id. at 609, 432 A.2d at 516, the
critical inquiry was "whether the TILA counterclaim arises out of the
same transaction as the claim for the debt." Id. at 610, 432 A.2d at
516. The threshold question, therefore, was whether Taylor's counterclaim arose from the same transaction which gave rise to CFS's claim.
In deciding this question, Justice Pollock first pointed out that the
disclosure obligations in the TILA were expressly designed to benefit
the credit consumer. Id. The court then recognized that the financing
charge was often determinative of whether the borrower entered into
the loan contract. Moreover, under federal law, parties are deemed to
contract in light of existing law. Therefore, the court held that the
TILA disclosure requirements and the penalties imposed for their
violation were implied terms of the contract between Taylor and
CFS, thus leading to the conclusion that the TILA counterclaim arose
from the same transaction which gave rise to CFS's claim. Id. at
610-11, 432 A.2d at 516-17.
The majority then dismissed CFS's contention that 15 U.S.C.
§ 1640(h) (1976) precluded a TILA counterclaim after the statute of
limitations had run. The court pointed out that section 1640(h) essentially "prohibits a debtor from taking 'any action to offset' the liability
of a creditor for a TILA violation.

. .

unless the creditor's liability has

been reduced to judgment." 86 N.J. at 612, 432 A.2d at 517. The
majority first rejected CFS's contention that the statutory phrase "any
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action to offset" included a counterclaim for recoupment. Id. Instead,
the court construed the statutory phrase as only referring to self-help
actions by a debtor. Id. The court then indicated that the purpose of
section 1640(h) is "to require a debtor to obtain judicial determination
of damages before making a deduction for TILA violations." Id. at
612, 432 A.2d at 517-18. The majority concluded that a creditor's suit
on the debt "serves the purpose of bringing the matter before the
court." Id. at 612-13, 432 A.2d at 518. The majority supported its
holding by emphasizing that a recent amendment to section 1640(h)
expressly states that 1640(h) does not bar a TILA counterclaim in a
creditor's suit on the debt. Id. at 613, 432 A.2d at 518. The court
concluded that the amendment was passed to clarify, rather than
modify, existing law. Id.
Finally the court focused on section 1640(e), which prescribes a
one-year statute of limitations for the filing of a TILA action. The
court held that the one-year limitation does not bar a counterclaim for
recoupment. Id. at 615, 432 A.2d at 519. The court noted that under
the modern trend in federal common law it is the legislative intent,
rather than the classification of the limitations statute as substantive
or procedural, that is determinative of whether a right is extinguished
or the remedy merely barred. Id. at 614, 432 A.2d at 518. Therefore,
Justice Pollock surveyed the legislative history and policy behind the
adoption of the TILA. Id. at 614-15, 432 A.2d at 518-19. Although
the majority found the Congressional intent behind establishing a
one-year period of limitations unclear, it recognized that TILA was
passed to remedy sharp, sometimes fraudulent, commercial lending
practices. Id. at 614, 432 A.2d at 518. To bar a debtor from asserting
the defense of recoupment, the majority reasoned, would be to frustrate the Congressional policy underpinning TILA. Id. at 615, 432
A.2d at 519. Thus, the majority held that "the survival of the recoupment defense in this context comports with the fundamental policy of
the statute of limitations." Id.
Justice Schreiber dissented, emphasizing that the "determinative
issue [was] the meaning of subsection 1640(e)." Id. at 616, 432 A.2d at
519 (Schreiber, J., dissenting). He stated that Congress had fashioned
a one-year statute of limitations to mitigate the severity of the complex
and demanding TILA disclosure requirements and that Congress had
intended "to balance the goals of encouraging compliance [with the
full disclosure requirements] without unfairly penalizing legitimate
creditors." Id. at 618, 432 A.2d at 521 (Schreiber, J., dissenting).
Justice Schreiber also commented that the majority's claim that enforcement of the Act would be frustrated if a defense of recoupment
was time-barred was not persuasive, since both the criminal sanctions
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under TILA and actions by the administrative agencies responsible for
enforcing the Act were not subject to the one-year limitation. Id. at
618, 432 A.2d at 520-21 (Schreiber, J., dissenting).
Although the court's decision reaches an equitable result, Justice
Schreiber's reading of Congressional intent in fashioning subsection
1640(e), though also speculative, is far more persuasive than the majority's reading. Congress's recent amendment of section 1640(e), effective April 1, 1982, allows debtors to plead the defense of recoupment despite the statute of limitations. Id. at 618, 432 A.2d at 521
(Schreiber, J., dissenting). Given the unclear legislative intent and the
conflicting court opinions, Congress's action is welcome.
j.s.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PmvILGEs AND IMMUNITIES-STATUTE
GIVING PREFERENCE TO NEW JERSEY CITIZENS AS EMPLOYEES UNDER
PUBLIC WORKS CONTRACTS UNCONSTITUTIONAL-Neshamin y

Constructors,Inc. v. Krause, 181 N.J. Super. 376, 437 A.2d 733
(Ch. Div. 1981).

New Jersey citizens Krause, Smith, and Forbes were rejected for
employment on a federally funded municipal project. They brought
suit in Lawrence Township municipal court against the principal
contractor, Neshaminy Constructors, Inc., for violation of N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 34:9-2 (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982). 181 N.J. Super. at

378-79, 437 A.2d at 734. That statute states that preference shall be
given to New Jersey citizens for employment on construction contracts
awarded by any New Jersey public body. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:9-2.
Neshaminy admitted violating the statute but brought an action in the
chancery division against Krause, Smith, and Forbes challenging the
statute's constitutionality on the ground that it violated the privileges
and immunities clause of the United States Constitution. 181 N.J.
Super. at 379, 437 A.2d at 734-35. The State of New Jersey was
granted the right to intervene in the chancery division under N.J. CT.
R. 4:29-4(d), and, along with defendants Krause, Smith, and Forbes,
sought to uphold the statute. 181 N.J. Super. at 379, 437 A.2d at

734-35.
Noting that the privileges and immunities clause requires substantial justification when one state discriminates against citizens of
another state, the court found no such justification and declared N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 34:9-2 unconstitutional. 181 N.J. Super. at 380-85, 437
A.2d at 735-38. Judge Dreier, writing for the court, considered the
recent United States Supreme Court decision in Hicklin v. Orbeck,
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437 U.S. 518 (1979), to be dispositive of the issue facing the chancery
division. 181 N.J. Super. at 380, 437 A.2d at 735. In striking down a
similar Alaska statute, the Hicklin Court propounded a two-prong test
for determining the constitutionality of "state hire" statutes. 437 U.S.
at 526-28. Judge Dreier succinctly stated the test as being that the
'nonresident must pose a peculiar source of evil, and that the cure
must bear a reasonable relation to the same evil, bearing always in
mind that the aim of the clause is substantial equality between resident and nonresident." 181 N.J. Super. at 382, 437 A.2d at 736.
The evil of unemployment was not found by the court to constitute sufficient justification for the New Jersey hire statute. Drawing
from the application of the Hicklin test employed in the identical New
York case of Salla v. Monroe County, 48 N.Y.2d 514, 423 N.Y.S.2d
878, 399 N.E.2d 909 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 909 (1980), the
court stated that the statute did not meet the first prong of the test
because the unemployment was not due to an influx of non-state
workers. Additionally, the court held that the cure proposed by the
statute was not substantially related to the evil of unemployment as
required by the second part of the test because it gave employment
preference to all New Jersey citizens, not just those who were unemployed. 181 N.J. Super. at 282-83, 437 A.2d at 738.
The court was not convinced by defendant's argument that the
discrimination allowed by the statute was warranted in view of the
seriously depressed conditions in the construction industry. Although
the court noted that this problem existed throughout the northeast,
the court cited Justice Cardozo's observation in Baldwin v. G.A.F.
Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935), that "the Constitution 'was framed
upon the theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or
swim together....' " 181 N.J. Super. at 385, 437 A.2d at 738.
The court was unpersuaded by New Jersey's argument that its
proprietary interest in the area of public works took the statute out of
the purview of the privileges and immunities clause. The court held
that the presence of significant federal initiative, funding, and control
in this case outweighed any proprietary considerations. Id. at 383-84,
437 A.2d at 737. The court also summarily dismissed the state's argument that the Alaska statute struck down in Hicklin was distinguishable because it was broader in scope than the New Jersey statute. 181
N.J. Super. at 383, 437 A.2d at 737.
Although the effectiveness of the New Jersey hire statute was put
into question by the amendment to New Jersey's antidiscrimination
statutes, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:2-1,:5-4 (West 1976), this court did
not decide the issue on those grounds. Rather, the statute was struck
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down solely because of its conflict with the privileges and immunities
clause. 181 N.J. Super. at 834 n.7, 437 A.2d at 737 n.7.
R.T.T.

EVIDENCE-HYPNOTICALLY

INDUCED TESTIMONY ADMISSIBLE IF RA-

SONABLY LIKELY TO RESULT IN RECALL COMPARABLE TO NORMAL

MEMORY-State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981).
In the early morning hours of June 22, 1978, Jane Sell was
stabbed several times while sleeping in her bedroom. 86 N.J. at 529,
432 A.2d at 88. The two suspects were her husband, David Sell, and
her former husband, Paul Hurd. Id. at 530, 432 A.2d at 88. Because
Mrs. Sell was unable to identify her assailant, she agreed to submit to
hypnotic treatment in order to remember what had happened. Id.
Two police officers accompanied Mrs. Sell to the office of a pyschiatrist and were present during the hypnotic session. Id. While under
hypnosis, Mrs. Sell identified the defendant, her former husband, as
her attacker. After the psychiatrist brought Mrs. Sell out of the trance,
he and one of the officers tried to convince her to accept the identification she had made. Yet, Jane Sell did not formally incriminate Paul
Hurd until six days later. Id. at 531-32, 432 A.2d at 89. Paul Hurd
was charged with assault with intent to kill. Id. at 532, 432 A.2d at
89.
The defendant asked the trial court to suppress a proposed incourt identification by Mrs. Sell. In support of his motion to suppress,
the defendant argued that Mrs. Sell's testimony was per se inadmissible because hypnosis did not satisfy the test in Frye v. United States,
293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), which required scientific procedures to
yield reasonably reliable results. 86 N.J. at 532, 432 A.2d at 89. In the
alternative he argued that because Mrs. Sell had been submitted to
coercion and suggestion, her identification was likely to result in
misidentification. Id. Applying the Frye test, the trial court held that
hypnotically refreshed testimony was not per se inadmissible, and the
court created a two-pronged test for admissibility. Id. at 532, 432
A.2d at 89. The first part of the test consisted of six procedural
safeguards with which the state must be shown to have complied by
clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 532-33, 432 A.2d at 89-90.
Under the second part of the test, the state would have to show by
clear and convincing evidence that "'there was no impermissibly suggestive or coercive conduct by the hypnotist and law enforcement
personnel connected with the hypnotic exercise."' Id. at 533, 432 A.2d
at 90. Applying those standards to the case, the trial court found that
the state had failed to meet the requirements of both parts of the test
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and accordingly granted the motion to suppress the identification.
Id.. The state's motion to the appellate division for leave to appeal
was denied. Although the New Jersey Supreme Court granted the
prosecutor leave to appeal, the supreme court's decision affirmed the
order of the trial court. Id.
In an opinion by Justice Pashman, the court held that "testimony
enhanced through hypnosis is admissible in a criminal trial if the court
finds that the use of hypnosis in the particular case was reasonably
likely to result in recall comparable in accuracy to normal human
memory." Id. at 543, 432 A.2d at 95. The court initially reviewed
some general information about hypnosis and the diverse treatment
given to the issue in other jurisdictions. Id. at 534-36, 432 A.2d at
90-91. Justice Pashman then addressed the issue whether hypnotically
refreshed testimony was per se inadmissible and used the general
acceptance standard set up by the trial court in accordance with the
Frye test for scientific evidence. Id. at 537, 432 A.2d at 92. The court
compared the problems associated with hypnotically induced testimony to those associated with ordinary eyewitness recall and acknowledged that, unless carefully controlled, a subject under hypnosis
could be influenced by the examiner, lose his critical judgment, or
confuse hypnotically induced memories with prior recall. Id. at 53940, 432 A.2d at 93-94. Despite these drawbacks, the court concluded
that a per se inadmissibility test was too broad since it would result in
the exclusion of evidence as reliable as that presented by other eyewitnesses. Id. at 541, 432 A.2d at 94.
Having dealt with that issue, the court set up a standard of
admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony applicable to individual cases. It gave an important role to the trial court which must
decide at a pretrial hearing or at a hearing out of the jury's presence
whether the standard had been met. Id. at 543, 432 A.2d at 95.
Admissibility may depend on whether the hypnosis is appropriate for
the kind of amnesia encountered, on whether the procedures followed
were reliable, or on whether the subject was amenable to hypnosis.
Id. at 544-45, 432 A.2d at 96. The court also adopted six procedural
safeguards: a party utilizing hypnotic testimony must employ a professional qualified as an expert to conduct the session; the expert must
be employed independently of the prosecution; the defense or law
enforcement officials may only give the expert recorded information;
the hypnotist must obtain the subject's version of the facts prior to the
session; the hypnotist must record or videotape all contacts with the
subject; and no other persons may be present during the session. Id. at
545-46, 432 A.2d at 96-97.
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The last question relating to the issue of admissibility concerned
the burden of proof. Because of the potential for abuse of the hypnotic
process, the court affirmed the trial court's ruling and required that
the state prove by clear and convincing evidence the admissibility of
testimony enhanced by hypnosis. Id. at 546-47, 432 A.2d at 97.
The court briefly looked at the due process argument raised by
the defendant. Justice Pashman concluded that because this issue was
closely intertwined with that of admissibility, it would not have to be
addressed if the hypnotically refreshed testimony were found to be
inadmissible; on the other hand, there probably would be no due
process issue if the state could meet its burden. In any case, the
defendant would have to show suggestiveness amounting to a constitutional violation by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 548, 432
A.2d at 98.
Addressing the facts of the case, the court determined that the
state had not met the procedural requirements and that it had not
proven the reliability of the hypnotic procedure. Id. at 548-49, 432
A.2d at 98. Justice Sullivan, joined by Justice Clifford, concurred in
the result but concluded that "hypnotically induced identification
testimony" should be per se inadmissible at criminal trials "because of
[its] inherent unreliability." Id. at 550, 432 A.2d at 99 (Sullivan &
Clifford, J.J., concurring).
In State v. Hurd, the supreme court clarified the utility of hypnosis as an evidentiary tool and enunciated clear guidelines for trial
courts to decide the reliability of such techniques in each instance.
Yet, because of the heavy burden of proof on the party seeking to
introduce hypnotically refreshed testimony, it seems unlikely that
such testimony can become more than an evidentiary means of last
resort.
N.B.

JURISDICTION-TAX COURT Is INFEIUOR COURT OF LIMITED JuRusDICTIoN-Alid, Inc. v. Township oJ North Bergen, 180 N.J.
Super. 592, 436 A.2d 102 (App. Div. 1981).
Defendant, the Township of North Bergen, completed and put

into effect a revaluation of assessed properties in 1974. As a result of
successful appeals of the revaluation to the Hudson County Board of
Taxation, the division of tax appeals, and the tax court, the Township
owed total refunds of approximately $6,000,000, of which approximately $725,000 was due plaintiffs. When judgments were still unpaid in 1980, plaintiffs moved in the tax court to compel the Township to pay the refunds; however, when they realized that the
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Township had not appropriated funds for that purpose, respondents
withdrew their motion and moved instead to restrain the Township
from adopting its 1980 budget until the court proceedings were concluded and to direct that its 1980 budget contain guidelines allowing
for payment of the refunds. 180 N.J. Super. at 593-94, 436 A.2d at
102-03.
On February 8, 1980, the tax court ordered the Township to
appropriate in its 1980 budget the funds necessary to pay all judgments rendered from 1974 to date plus interest. In addition, a restraining order was issued whioh prevented adoption of the final
budget until it was reviewed and approved by the court. Once the
budget was approved, all plaintiffs were to be reimbursed for their
claims. Id. at 594, 436 A.2d at 103. However, at the request of the
appellant and by agreement of the plaintiffs and the court, the order
was subsequently rescinded. Id. at 595, 436 A.2d at 103. Defendant
argued that it would be unable to make the payments, even if the
budget were approved, because of insufficient funds and possible
violation of the municipal "cap" law, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:4-45.1,
-45.5 (West 1980). The Township suggested that it be allowed to sell
$6,100,000 of its bonds under the bond ordinance that had been
previously approved by the local finance board to cover all outstanding claims resulting from the revaluation appeals. On March 19, 1980,
the parties signed a consent order directing that the bonds be sold,
that the proceeds be earmarked to satisfy the claims, and that the
plaintiffs be reimbursed for their claims plus interest. 180 N.J. Super.
at 595, 436 A.2d at 103.
Three months later an order to show cause was issued by the tax
court at respondents' request to determine whether the municipality
was complying with the consent order. At that time it became apparent that the $6,100,000 bond issue was actually part of an
$18,000,000 issue, the balance of which had not been approved by the
local finance board. Id. at 596, 436 A.2d at 103-04. Citing N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:3A-4 (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982), the tax court issued
another order on July 23, 1980, granting relief to the respondents in
the form of the anticipated refunds and accumulated interest, the
percent of interest to vary according to the date of the judgment.
Under this order the funds were to be raised via the bond sale as
originally planned. Should the funds prove insufficient to satisfy all
claims, the money would be distributed on a pro rata basis. Any
balance owed would be resolved by granting credit on future taxes or
by direct reimbursement from the 1981 budget. Progress reports were
to be submitted to the court on a monthly basis until the issue was
completely resolved, with a $100 fine for each day the reports were
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late. 180 N.J. Super. at 596-97, 436 A.2d at 104-05. The Township
appealed the tax court's order of July 23, 1980, and the appellate
division stayed its enforcement pending disposition of the appeal. Id.
at 598, 436 A.2d at 105.
Writing for the appellate division, Judge Milmed first addressed
the issue whether the tax court had jurisdiction over respondents'
post-judgment motions. He rejected the tax court's determination that
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:3A-4(a) gave it jurisdiction equal to that of the
original jurisdiction of the trial division of the superior court by
relying heavily upon the legislative history and intent of the statute.
The three sources which provided the foundation for the court's decision included: the June 26, 1977, report of a State Senate Special
Committee on Tax Appeals Procedure; the February 13, 1979, Statement of the Senate Revenue, Finance and Appropriations Committee
to the Senate, No. 3009 with committee amendments; and the press
release from the Governor's Office on June 13, 1978, the day that the
bill was signed. The report and statement both refer to the tax court as
an inferior court of limited jurisdiction. All three sources clearly assert
that the tax court would effectively serve as the embodiment of the
division of tax appeals with the only significant difference being the
move from the executive to the judicial branch of government. 180
N.J. Super. at 595-603, 436 A.2d at 105-08. The court specifically
noted that both points manifest themselves in the statute itself; N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:3A-1 states that the tax court is "an inferior court of
limited jurisdiction," and N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:3A-3 states that "[t]he
tax court shall . . . have jurisdiction to hear and determine all tax
appeals of such character as now are taken to, and heard by and
determined by, the Division of Tax Appeals." Therefore, the court
concluded that it was clearly the intent of the committees and the
Senate to substitute an inferior court of limited jurisdiction, the tax
court, for the division of tax appeals. 180 N.J. Super. at 601-02, 436
A.2d at 107.

The appellate court next examined N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§ 2A:3A-

4.1(a)to determine the tax court's scope of review, and noted that
"[p]laintiffs' post-judgment motions. . . did not call for review of any
'act, action, proceeding, ruling, decision, order or judgment of the
county board of taxation or the Director of the Division of Taxation.' " 180 N.J. Super. at 603, 436 A.2d at 108. Instead, the tax court
was requested to review the action of the defendant municipality, an
area which the court found completely beyond the jurisdiction not
only of the division of tax appeals, but also of the tax court. 180 N.J.
Super. at 603, 436 A.2d at 108.
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Turning to the order itself, the appellate court found that the
relief contained therein was similar to mandamus and therefore beyond the reach of the tax court. The appellate court noted that N.J.
CT. R. 4:69-1, relied upon by the tax court as authority for that relief,
actually precluded the tax court from granting the relief requested by
respondents when it stated: " '[r]elief heretofore available by prerogative writs and not available under. .. Rule 8:2 [review jurisdiction of
the tax court] shall be afforded by a civil action in the Law Division of
the Superior Court.' " Id. at 604, 436 A.2d at 109. Under N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:3A-4(a), the tax court could only grant legal and equitable
relief for matters within its jurisdiction. Therefore, the court concluded that the jurisdiction of the tax court was in no way equal to
that of the trial division of the superior court. Id. the appellate court
held that the tax court had "no jurisdiction whatever to entertain
plaintiff's post-judgment motions and, accordingly, no jurisdiction to
grant any of the relief which it did in this case." Id. at 605, 436 A.2d
at 110. The court deemed appellant's other contentions moot and did
not consider them. Id. The court vacated the lower court's order and
transferred the action to the law division of the superior court.
The appellate court's decision has defined the parameters of the
tax court's limited jurisdiction as provided in N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:3A-1. In so doing, the court has served notice that the legislative
intent regarding the tax court will be strictly adhered to within those
parameters. Future litigants, as well as the tax court itself, would be
well advised to scrutinize the jurisdictional issue with care.
G.M.

PENSIONS-PUBLIc

EMPLOYEE'S PENSION NOT FORFEITABLE UPON
CONVICTION OF CRIME WHERE CRIMINAL ACT UNRELATED TO EMPLOYMENT-Masse v. Board of Trustees, Public Employees' Re-

tirement System, 87 N.J. 252, 432 A.2d 1339 (1981).
On February 17, 1977, Victor Masse, Assistant Superintendent of

Water and Sewers for the Borough of Highlands, applied to the state
for a pension in connection with his anticipated early retirement. At
that time he had been employed by the borough for twenty-seven
years. 87 N.J. at 254, 432 A.2d at 1340.
The Board of Trustees of the Public Employees' Retirement System informed Masse that because on January 31, 1977, he had
pleaded guilty to two charges of impairing the morals and contribut-
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ing to the delinquency of a minor in violation of N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:96-3, -4 (West 1969), all service prior to that date would be
deemed not creditable toward calculating his pension entitlement.
The Board's decision was grounded in the established administrative
practice of disallowing credit for all public service rendered prior to
the date of conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude. 87 N.J.
at 254, 432 A.2d at 1340. Masse appealed the Board's decision and the
appellate division reversed. The supreme court granted certification.
The supreme court held that a public employee does not forfeit
all otherwise creditable service accumulated toward a pension upon
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude where the criminal
act is unconnected to the work from which the employee derives the
pension claim. Id. at 264, 432 A.2d at 1345. Much of the reasoning
turned upon the meaning of the word "honorable" as it applied in the
statutes and prior case law to the requirement of creditable service.
The court acknowledged that an honorable service requirement was
implicit in all public employees' pension statutes. Id. at 255-56, 432
A.2d at 1341. Citing a number of decisions in which pensions were
forfeited, the court noted that the criminal acts arose out of the
pension-related service. The majority found that the rule by which
one forfeits previously accumulated creditable service when convicted
"of a crime involving moral turpitude . . .assumes a nexus between
the dishonorable conduct and the public employment." Id. at 257,
432 A.2d at 1341.
The court concluded that it was not the legislative intent to
impose the harsh result of loss of pension rights for crimes unrelated to
the publicly held employment. Id. at 258-59, 432 A.2d at 1342.
Adopting the "more modern concept" put forth in Watt v. Mayor &
Council of Fanklin, 21 N.J. 274, 279, 121 A.2d 499, 501 (1976), that
pensions are a form of compensation and not mere gratuities bestowed
by the sovereign, the court looked to the statutes to discern the relevant legislative intent. Justice Schreiber, writing for the majority,
found that the Public Employees' Retirement System, the functions of

which are embodied in N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§ 43:15A-6 (West 1962),

provided pensions to qualified state, county and municipal employees
based on three things-age, compensation and service. 87 N.J. at 255,
432 A.2d at 1340. "Service" must be "creditable" which, the court
deduced, requires at the minimum work performed by the employee.
Id. at 255, 432 A.2d at 1340-41. Accepting that "service" implied
honorable service, and that pensions are a form of compensation, the
court found that the statute allows a pension to vest in one who leaves
public service after serving fifteen years, but before reaching retirement age. Id. at 261, 432 A.2d at 1344. Furthermore, the legislature
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reserved to those persons the privilege of electing certain pension
benefits when they reached retirement age unless they were removed
for cause on charges of misconduct or delinquency. Id. The court
concluded that the statute was not intended to apply to employees
convicted of non-service related crimes. Id.
Another indication of legislative intent is found in that portion of
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:1-2 (West 1962) which provides that no pension
benefits may be paid to any person during a period of incarceration
for a crime involving moral turpitude. Benefits are to be paid, however, to members of the immediate family if necessary for their maintenance. 87 N.J. at 263, 432 A.2d at 1345.
For further support, the court examined certain New Jersey criminal code statutes which impose additional penalties such as perpetual
disqualification from holding public office and denial of pension
rights, and found them limited in their applicability to offenses "involving or touching upon" the employment. Id. at 262, 432 A.2d at
1344. This demonstrated that "when the Legislature has focused on
offenses related and unrelated to the public employment, it has chosen
to treat the offenders differently." Id. The court concluded that to
judicially impose the additional penalty of pension forfeiture upon
one convicted of a non-work related crime, even where that crime
involved moral turpitude, would usurp the Legislature's right to fix
punishment. Id. at 263, 432 A.2d at 1345.
Justice Clifford dissented in Masse, relying upon his dissenting
opinion in the companion case of Procaccinov. New Jersey Department of the Treasury, 87 N.J. 265, 268-75, 432 A.2d 1346, 1347-51
(1981) (Clifford, J., dissenting). The dissent in Procaccinostated that
prior case law conclusively established pension forfeiture in situations
such as those at bar. Id. at 270, 432 A.2d at 1348 (Clifford, J.,
dissenting). Moreover, Justice Clifford found that the nexus established by the majority opinion in Masse "overturn[ed] by judicial fiat
that which has for decades been accepted by the Legislature as the
operative interpretation of its statutes." Id. at 272, 432 A.2d at 1349
(Clifford, J., dissenting).
Despite the dissent's admonition that such changes in the law are
more appropriately left to the legislature, the supreme court has
adopted a sound and humanitarian rule. The Masse decision does not
relax the high standards to which a public employee is held, and the
court has provided a flexible approach for determining pension disputes.
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PERSONAL PROPERTY-PARKINc GARAGE OPERATOR UNDER DUTY
To USE REASONABLE CARE To PROTECT PARKED CAR AND CONTENTS WITHIN-McGlynn v. ParkingAuthority, 86 N.J. 551, 432

A.2d 99 (1981).
On October 30, 1977, Michael Backer parked his automobile in
the underground Military Park Garage in downtown Newark. 86 N.J.
at 554-55, 432 A.2d at 101. He returned the next day and discovered
that the antenna was bent and four hubcaps were missing. Id. at 555,
432 A.2d at 101. On December 7, 1977, Roger McGlynn parked his
convertible in the garage. Id. at 554, 432 A.2d at 101. When he
returned that afternoon, the top of the convertible was slit open and
his portable cassette recorder and forty tapes were missing. Id. Both
men had received printed tickets from a machine upon entering the
garage, had locked their cars, and had taken their keys. Id.
Prior to these incidents, similar acts of theft and vandalism were
reported to the Newark Parking Authority which owned the garage.
Id. at 555, 432 A.2d at 101. The Authority claimed that, as a security
procedure, garage attendants and Newark policemen patrolled the
three levels and stairways. Id. At the time the vandalism occurred,
one or two attendants were on duty and the Newark police were
patrolling the garage. Id.
McGlynn and Backer filed separate suits, charging that the Authority was liable for the theft of property and damage to their cars
because it breached its bailment contract and acted negligently. Id.
The trial court in both cases did not allow the Authority to introduce
the limitation of liability clause found on the tickets because it failed
to plead limitation of liability as an affirmative defense. Id., 432 A.2d
at 101. The jury in McGlynn returned a verdict of $1,050, after the
trial judge found evidence of a bailment and instructed them to
presume negligence upon proof of damage. Id. In the second non-jury
trial, the same judge awarded damages of $150 after a similar finding
of a bailment and a presumption of negligence upon proof of damage.
Id. at 555-56, 432 A.2d at 101.
On appeal by direct certification, the New Jersey Supreme Court
consolidated the two cases and affirmed both trial court decisions in a
unanimous opinion. Id. at 554, 432 A.2d at 101. The court held that
"the operator of an enclosed garage is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect the parked cars and those items one would expect
reasonably to find within them," and that "a presumption of negligence arises from damage to a car parked in an enclosed garage." Id.
at 561-62, 432 A.2d at 104-05. Based on this reasoning the court
concluded that the Authority violated its duty of care by failing to
effectively protect both the interior and exterior of the plaintiffs'
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parked cars from reasonably foreseeable attacks by vandals. Id. at
563, 432 A.2d at 105. The court also determined that under the
circumstances, the Authority failed to rebut the presumption of liability with proof that its negligence did not cause the loss or that it
exercised reasonable care. Id.
Justice Pollock, writing for the court, noted that parking lot or
garage cases are traditionally analyzed by the courts in terms of a
bailment, lease, or license relationship between the owner of the car
and the parking lot or garage. Id. at 556, 432 A.2d at 102. The
modern approach to the problem, however, is to deemphasize the
contract aspects of the transaction and to concentrate on the amount
of possession and control transferred from one party to another. Id. at
557, 432 A.2d at 102. Unfortunately, courts have reacted differently
in deciding whether the facts indicate sufficient possession and control
to constitute a bailment. Id. at 558-59, 432 A.2d at 103. These discrepancies led Justice Pollock to conclude that bailment is an outmoded concept and that negligence principles provide a more
straightforward method of examining parking lot and garage cases.
Id. at 559, 432 A.2d at 103.
Applying the principles of negligence, the court reasoned that the
liability of a garage or parking lot owner depends on the duty of care
owed to its customers. Id. This duty of care is determined by viewing
all the relevant circumstances of the case, including: 1) possession and
control of the premises; 2) foreseeability of the harm to the exterior of
the parked cars and all the items reasonably expected to be found
within them; and 3) considerations of public policy. Id. at 559-60, 432
A.2d at 103-04.
In the instant case, the court found that the Authority had a duty
of care to protect the parked cars from vandalism. Id. at 561, 432
A.2d at 104. First, employees of the Authority controlled access to the
parked cars. Id. at 560, 432 A.2d at 104. Second, the Authority knew
of prior incidents of vandalism, thus the risk of harm was foreseeable.
Id. Since cassette players and cassettes are attachments in many cars,
the court reasoned that it was foreseeable that a car would contain
them. Id. at 561, 432 A.2d at 104. Thus, the Authority's duty of care
included not only the antenna and hubcaps on the exterior of the
parked car, but also the cassette player and cassettes within. Id.
Third, by imposing a duty of care on the Authority, the court burdened the party who was in a better position to protect a parked car
and to distribute the costs of protection through parking fees. Id. at
560, 432 A.2d at 104.
The court noted that once the car owner establishes that damage
or loss occurred, the primary effect of the presumption is to shift to the
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garage operator the burden of showing that he was not negligent or
that his negligence did not cause the damage. Id. Yet even if contrary
evidence is produced, and the presumption is successfully rebutted,
the underlying facts may still be used to support an inference of
negligence. Id. at 563, 432 A.2d at 105.
In this case, the court found that the Authority controlled the
premises and had a duty to ensure that vandals did not damage
parked cars or items contained within them. Id. Thus, upon proof of
damage, the Authority was required to show that its negligence did
not cause the loss or that it exercised due care. Id. Since the Authority
failed to rebut the presumption or to counter an affirmative showing
of negligence in both cases, the court affirmed the trial court's judgments. Id. at 563-64, 432 A.2d at 105-06.
In this opinion, the court utilized negligence rather than property
law principles to impose liability. Since the garage owner is in a better
position to protect the parked car and to spread the cost of this
protection through parking fees, the court concluded that a presumption of negligence is needed to protect the interests of the individual
car owner. By combining public policy considerations with principles
of negligence, the court demonstrated its willingness to insulate the
public from the costs of automobile vandalism in parking garages.
L.R.G.

RESCISSION-RECISSION

OF CONSUMER'S PURCHASE OF AUTOMOBILE

Ventura v. Ford Motor Corp., 180 N.J. Super. 45, 433 A.2d 801
(1981).
PERMITTED UPON PROOF OF BREACH OF LIMITED WARRANTY-

Plaintiff, Guiseppe Ventura, purchased a new 1978 Mercury
Marquis Brougham from Marino Auto Sales, Inc. (Marino), an authorized dealer of the manufacturer, Ford Motor Corporation (Ford). Id.
at 51-52, 433 A.2d at 804. Soon after the purchase, plaintiff began to
experience engine hesitation and stalling which the dealer, Marino,
failed to correct. Id. at 52, 433 A.2d at 804. The car was inspected by
Ford's regional service manager and mechanical specialist who could
not find the problem and who informed the plaintiff that he would
"have to live with this one." Id. When the plaintiff was prevented
from returning the vehicle to the dealer, he brought suit against
Marino and Ford for damages arising from the automobile's defects.
Id. at 51-52, 433 A.2d at 804. The trial court awarded plaintiff a
rescission of the purchase and damages against Marino, as well as
counsel fees against Ford. Id. at 52, 433 A.2d at 804. The court also
granted Marino's claim for indemnification against Ford. Id.
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The trial in the chancery division of the superior court was
procedurally unusual in that the judge, because of the absence of
Marino's attorney, allowed the case against Ford to continue while
severing the case against Marino rather than waiting to hear the entire
case. Id. at 52-53, 433 A.2d at 805. Although Ford did not raise
objections at that time, it unsuccessfully argued on appeal that the
procedure created a prejudicial error. Id. at 53, 433 A.2d at 805.
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case in the first trial, the judge
found that Ford had breached its warranty and that the car was
substantially impaired. Id. at 56, 433 A.2d at 806. Although the
plaintiff had not proved damages against Ford, the court held that he
was entitled, under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, to rescind the
purchase from the dealer and to recover attorney's fees from Ford. Id.
at 54, 433 A.2d at 805. Marino presented its case in the second trial.
Although Marino contended that there was no proof of wrongdoing
on its part and, consequently, that there were no grounds for rescission, the court permitted the rescission against Marino. Id. at 56-57,
433 A.2d at 806-07. The court, because of Ford's failure to prove that
Marino was the wrongful party, allowed Marino's claim for indemnification from Ford. Id. at 56, 433 A.2d at 806. Ford was permitted to
appeal the rescission remedy against Marino, as that judgment was
the basis of Ford's liability to the dealer. Id. at 56, 433 A.2d at 806-07.
On appeal Ford claimed that the trial court's decision to rescind
was erroneous because it was based on the Magnuson-Moss Warranty
Act's requirements for a full warranty, whereas the warranty given by
Ford was limited. Id. at 60, 433 A.2d at 809. The court agreed that
under the definitions presented in the Act the warranty given by Ford
was a limited one, but stated that allowing the same remedy under
state law for the breach of a limited warranty would not be prohibited by the Act. Id. at 63, 433 A.2d at 810. The court, therefore,
upheld the rescission. Id.
The contract of sale between the plaintiff and Marino contained
language expressly disclaiming all warranties, express or implied,
with the exception of the warranty given by the manufacturer to a
purchaser of a new automobile at delivery. Id. at 61, 433 A.2d at 809.
In the sales contract Marino also agreed to fulfill all terms of the
owner service policy. Id. Ford contended at trial that these provisions
created in Marino a "duty" to repair defects in the automobiles. Id.
The court concluded that the above provisions constituted a written
warranty as defined by the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. Id. at 62,
433 A.2d at 810. The Act also provides that a dealer who furnishes a
consumer with a written warranty may not disclaim an implied warranty. Id. at 68, 433 A.2d at 809. From this the court reasoned that
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Marino's written warranty in the sales contract invalidated its disclaimer of the implied warranty of merchantability. Id. at 62, 433
A.2d at 810.
The court then set forth reasons why the plaintiff would have
been entitled to rescission and a refund of the purchase price as
against Ford rather than Marino. The court suggested that the plaintiff could have recovered from Ford based on a breach of Ford's
warranty given to the plaintiff at the time of delivery of the new
automobile. Id. at 63, 433 A.2d at 810. Although the warranty specified that the repairs would be made by a Ford dealer, Ford itself
would have been liable for the failure of the dealer, its authorized
representative, to make the guaranteed repairs. Id. at 63-64, 433 A.2d
at 810-11. Normally the damages for breach of warranty are defined
as the difference between the purchase price and the market value of
the defective product. The plaintiff would have been allowed rescission of the contract, however, despite the lack of privity between
himself and Ford, under the decision in Herbstman v. Eastman Kodak Co., 68 N.J. 1, 15-16, 342 A.2d 181, 188-89 (1975) (Conford, J.,
concprring). In that opinion Judge Conford found that under the
principles of strict liability, a purchaser of a defective product is
entitled to rescission and a refund from the manufacturer despite lack
of privity if "the defect causes substantial impairment of the value of
the product." Id. The trial court found the value of the plaintiff's
automobile in the present case to be substantially impaired. 180 N.J.
Super. at 54, 433 A.2d at 805.
The court also suggested that the plaintiff could have recovered
the purchase price from Ford under state law in a breach of contract
action for which rescission is an appropriate remedy. Id. at 65, 433
A.2d at 811. Success in such an action would require viewing the
warranty as establishing a "contractual obligation" on the part of the
manufacturer to the buyer. Id. Although the court raised these questions concerning the plaintiff's possible direct recovery from Ford, no
determination was made in the matter. Id. at 68-69, 433 A.2d at 813.
Ford also contended that counsel fees were improperly awarded,
since the trial court did not enter a judgment in favor of the plaintiff
against Ford and Ford was not given adequate notice of the plaintiff's
problems with the car. Id. at 66-67, 433 A.2d at 812-13. The latter
argument was based upon the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act's provision that prosecution will not be permitted against a manufacturer
who is not given ample opportunity to correct a problem. Id. at 66,
433 A.2d at 812. The court found, however, that ample opportunity
to correct the problem was given to Ford through its designated
representative, Marino, and through the plaintiff's meeting with
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Ford's regional manager and service specialist. Id. As to the first
argument, the court reasoned that the plaintiff was entitled to nominal damages against Ford, thereby making him, again under the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, entitled to attorney's fees as part of
the judgment. Id. at 66-67, 433 A.2d at 812.
In this case the court allowed the consumer to rescind the purchase of a defective product upon a breach of a limited warranty
where the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act had specified such relief
only for a breach of a full warranty. Further, the court opened up the
possibility of consumer rescission against the manufacturer where the
consumer purchased through a dealer. In short, the court's opinion
broadens the choice of remedies for consumers in a breach of warranty situation and potentially increases the number of parties against
whom rescission may be enforced.
B.K.

STANDING TO SUE-ALL

PERSONS HAVE STANDING TO PErITION

COURT FOR APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIAN IN INCOMPETENCY PRO-

CEINGs-In

re Alice Bennett, 180 N.J. Super. 406, 434 A.2d

1155 (Ch. Div. 1981).
Alice Bennett, an 82 year old grandmother, was found wandering the streets of Belmar, New Jersey. In an attempt to aid her the
Monmouth County Board of Social Services contacted the plaintiff,
Protective Services for the Elderly, an agency formed "to protect the
frail elderly in Monmouth County who are in need of crisis intervention." 180 N.J. Super at 408, 434 A.2d at 1155.
Plaintiff, relying upon its agency status, filed a complaint seeking
an incompetency hearing and the appointment of a guardian for Alice
Bennett and her property. The court granted the hearing and Alice
Bennett was declared incompetent. Her grandson, Harold Bennett,
subsequently moved to vacate the judgment of incompetency on the
ground that plaintiff lacked standing.
The trial judge explored both English common law and New
Jersey precedent, and concluded that "there are no special rules of
standing governing incompetency proceedings. General principles of
standing therefore apply." Id. at 410, 434 A.2d at 1156. In so doing,
the court dismissed the contention that only relatives and creditors
have the necessary standing to request an incompetency hearing and
the appointment of a guardian. The court thus recognized that a
strong public interest, such as that possessed by Protective Services for
the Elderly, may be a "sufficient stake" to grant standing.
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Not content with this innovation, the court went even further
and ruled that "any person may petition.

. .

for the appointment of a

guardian in the declaration of incompetency," thereby dispensing
with the strong public interest requirement previously- advocated.
Id. at 413, 434 A.2d at 1158. As Judge Yaccarino stated, "all of the
reasons which previously existed for the requirement of standing are
no longer viable." Id. at 413, 434 A.2d at 1158. Guardians must post
security for their appointment, and the "court stands between the
alleged incompetent and the person petitioning for the declaration,
• ..ready to protect the incompetent to the end of time." Id. at 413,
434 A.2d at 1158.
This decision isa realistic, yet unpalatable one. On the one hand,
it acknowledges society's current preference for consigning the care of
the elderly and the incompetent to public and private agencies. On
the other hand, it grants these agencies the means with which to
designate and perpetuate their clientele. Similarly, where a family
member hesitates to seek guardianship and to have a relative declared
incompetent, he may be preempted by an avaricious agency. Although the proposed solicitude of the courts is comforting to an extent,
the courts are already overburdened. Clearly the situation presents
substantial opportunities for abuse, and is more properly deserving of
legislative attention and resolution.
M.J.M.

TORTS-COMMERCIAL PROPERTY OWNERS HAVE DUTY TO MAINTAIN
ABUTTING SIDEWALKS IN REASONABLY

GOOD CONDITION-Stewart

v. 104 Wallace Street, Inc., 87 N.J. 146, 432 A.2d 881 (1981).
Harold Stewart brought an action to recover damages for injuries
he sustained when, upon leaving Ernie's Tavern, he fell on a dilapidated sidewalk abutting a vacant lot adjacent to the tavern. 87 N.J. at
149-50, 432 A.2d at 883. The plaintiff sued both Jay-Nan Corp.,
which owned the vacant lot and the property on which Ernie's was
located, and 104 Wallace Street, Inc., the owner of Ernie's Tavern.
Id. at 150, 432 A.2d at 883. The individual owners of the two corporations were identical. Id. Defendant 104 Wallace Street, Inc. impleaded Public Service Electric & Gas Company as a third party
defendant. Id. The issue confronting the court was whether a commercial landowner could be held liable for pedestrian injuries caused
by the dilapidated condition of the sidewalk abutting his property.
The trial court dismissed plaintiff's complaint during pretrial
proceedings due to the lack of sufficient proof of negligence in the
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construction or repair of the sidewalk by defendant or its precedessor
in title. Id. The third party action against Public Service also was
dismissed. Id. The supreme court granted direct certification to the
superior court, law division, to reconsider the no-liability rule of
Yanhko v. Fane, 70 N.J. 528, 532, 362 A.2d 1, 3 (1976). The court
affirmed the judgment of the trial court in dismissing plaintiff's complaint against the tavern owner, 104 Wallace Street, Inc., but reversed the dismissal of the complaint against the property owner,
Jay-Nan Corp., and remanded the case for trial. 87 N.J. at 150, 432
A.2d at 884. In a major departure from precedent, the supreme court
held that a commercial property owner could be held liable for injuries sustained on an abutting, deteriorated sidewalk when the owner
negligently fails to maintain the sidewalk in reasonably good condition. Id. The instant decision overruled the court's earlier position on
this issue as enunciated in Yanhko. The Yanhko court had held that
"'an abutting owner is not liable for the condition of a sidewalk caused
by the action of the elements or by wear and tear incident to public
use." 70 N.J. at 532, 362 A.2d at 3. An abutting owner could only be
held liable for "negligent construction or repair of the sidewalk by
himself or by a specified predecessor in title or for direct use or
obstruction of the sidewalk by the owner in such a manner as to
render it unsafe for passersby." Id.
Several arguments were advanced in favor of retaining the no-liability rule of Yanhko. The weight of precedent was one such argument. Id. at 154, 432 A.2d at 886. Justice Pashman, however, writing
for the court, stated that "with respect to abutting commercial property owners, [the present law] is anachronistic and produces harsh
and unfair results." Id. at 150, 432 A.2d at 884. A second argument
for retaining the Yanhko rule was that imposing liability would be
unduly onerous on the property owner. Id. at 154, 432 A.2d at 886.
The court reasoned, however, that the property owner has certain
rights and interests in the abutting sidewalk. For a commercial
owner, the sidewalk not only increases access to and the value of the
property, but "[p]ublic use of commercial establishments is facilitated
by the existence of sidewalks." Id. at 152, 432 A.2d at 884. Liability
insurance to cover any breach of this duty will be available; the cost of
such insurance will be treated by commercial property owners as one
of the necessary costs of doing business. Id. at 160, 432 A.2d at 889.
Another contention was that establishing a tort duty of care
would arbitrarily impose liability on the abutting owner "for no
better reason than that his property is proximate to the sidewalk."
Yanhko v. Fane, 70 N.J. at 534, 362 A.2d at 4. To support imposing a
duty of care, the court reasoned that the obvious arbitrariness is the
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fact that an injured plaintiff has a cause of action if injured inside the
business premises as a result of the owner's failure to maintain safe
premises, but will have no cause of action if injured outside the
entrance. 87 N.J. at 156-57, 432 A.2d at 887. The fortuitous locale of
the accident arbitrarily bars an injured plaintiff from recovery.
A final argument against imposing liability, posited by the defendant, was that the law of no-liability adequately protected pedestrians. The majority responded that the rule "is derived from conditions that no longer exist and is not responsive to current urban
conditions." Id. at 155, 432 A.2d at 886. The no-liability rule had its
origins in early common law when the sovereign had responsibility for
maintaining highways. In New Jersey, the primary responsibility for
maintaining sidewalks was originally placed on the government.
However, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:65-14 (West 1967) authorizes local
governments to make it "the duty of any owner of abutting lands...
to construct, repair, alter or relay any curb or sidewalk or section
thereof." Id. Sidewalk maintenance is no longer the sole responsibility
of municipal government. Additionally, injured pedestrians often had
a difficult burden of proof. Under the old rule proof of negligence
involved determining who built the sidewalk, when it was built, and
what the standards of construction were at the time it was built. 87
N.J. at 156, 432 A.2d at 887. Many injured plaintiffs were barred
from recovery because of such "extremely elusive" proof. Id.
The court found these arguments unpersuasive and imposed a
duty of care on commercial property owners for the maintenance of
abutting sidewalks. Breach of this duty will give rise to a cause of
action for a pedestrian injured by improper sidewalk maintenance;
earlier problems of proof of negligent construction or repair are eliminated. Now, recovery for injuries received in front of commercial
premises is subject to the same standards used to determine liability
for injuries received inside commercial property. Id. at 158, 432 A.2d
at 887. Commercial property owners will have an incentive to keep
the sidewalks in repair. Id. at 157, 432 A.2d at 887. Under the former
rule liability was imposed only for work negligently undertaken and
not for neglect. Now, the owner can be liable for negligence in not
repairing the sidewalks.
Imposing a duty to inspect and repair sidewalks, when necessary,
does not create a new area of liability but merely adds to duties of
abutting property owners which already exist. Id. at 159, 432 A.2d at
888. However, in a dissenting opinion, Justices Sullivan and Clifford
opposed the additional duties for commercial property owners. The
dissent stated that the primary responsibility for maintaining public
rights of way should remain on the government; liability for public
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sidewalk accidents due to ordinary wear and tear should not be placed
on property owners. Id. at 162, 432 A.2d at 890 (Clifford & Sullivan,
J.J., dissenting).
The Stewart holding is limited in two ways. First, the standard of
care is reasonableness. Id. at 158, 432 A.2d at 888. The burden of
proof is on the plaintiff to show an unreasonable act or omission by
the property owner for recovery. Second, the duty is imposed on
commercial property owners only. Id. at 159, 432 A.2d at 888. In a
concurring opinion, Justice Schreiber proposes a broader category
which will include residential property owners. He reasons that imposing a duty to maintain abutting sidewalks depends on a sound
policy justification. Factors going into such a justification include the
relationship of the parties, the nature of the risk, determining which
party is in a position to prevent the dangerous condition, and the
party who should bear the expenses resulting from the injury. Id. at
161, 432 A.2d at 889 (Schreiber, J., concurring). These factors are
applicable between an injured pedestrian and a commercial property
owner as well as a residential owner. Unless the municipality has
control over the maintenance of the sidewalk, the residential owner
should be liable just as the commercial owner.
The supreme court's ruling in Stewart significantly changes the
liability of commercial property owners with respect to the upkeep of
abutting sidewalks. The so-called Pennsylvania rule, which places
liability on property owners for failure to keep the abutting sidewalks
safe, has traditionally been an anomaly in tort law. See Annot., 88
A.L.R. 2d 331, 348 (1963). The Stewart ruling places New Jersey in
the minority of jurisdictions on this issue. This case indicates New
Jersey's willingness to award relief to the injured pedestrian. By placing the duty to inspect and repair sidewalks upon those with superior
knowledge of their condition, namely, the property owner, not only is
the public's safety guarded, but an innocently injured pedestrian has
the possibility of recovering.
J.F.

TORTS-WRONGFUL LIFE-PHYSICIANS WHO DENY PARENTS RIGHT
To MAKE INFORMED CHOICE WHETHER To GIVE BIRTH TO CHILD
WITH

CYSTIC

FIBROSIS

LIABLE

FOR

INCREMENTAL

MEDICAL

CosTS-Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 432 A.2d 834 (1981).
Infant plaintiff Ann Schroeder was a patient of defendants,
Perkel and Venin, pediatric physicians, from May 1970 to September
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1974. During this period defendants failed to diagnose Ann's illness as
cystic fibrosis. 87 N.J. at 57, 432 A.2d at 836. In September 1974
defendant Venin employed the services of Dr. Grotsky, a digestive
disorder specialist, who diagnosed the child's illness as cystic fibrosis.
Id. at 59, 432 A.2d at 837. Dr. Grotsky administered the sweat test, a
safe and reliable test which analyzes the salt concentration in perspiration; defendants had relied on the less accurate stool test. Id. at 60,
432 A.2d at 837. When the diagnosis was made the infant's mother
was eight months pregnant with her second child, Thomas, who
shortly after his birth was also diagnosed as having cystic fibrosis. Id.
at 60-61, 432 A.2d at 837.
Mr. and Mrs. Schroeder alleged that defendants' negligent failure to diagnose their child's illness denied them the right to make an
informed decision as to whether they should conceive a second child.
Id. at 61, 432 A.2d at 837. They claimed damages for the increased
medical costs of raising Thomas. The Supreme Court of New Jersey
reversed the summary judgment of plaintiffs' action for damages for
medical costs and remanded it for trial. Id. at 57, 432 A.2d at 835.
At the trial level, Mr. and Mrs. Schroeder on behalf of themselves, and Mrs. Schroeder, as guardian ad litem for her two children,
brought four causes of action seeking damages: first, for Ann's pain
and suffering resulting from defendants' negligent failure to diagnose
cystic fibrosis; second, for the parents' past medical costs; third, for
the mental anguish suffered from the wrongful birth and the raising of
Thomas; and fourth, for the infant Thomas' pain and suffering for
being born with and having to live as a child with cystic fibrosis. Id.
at 60-61, 432 A.2d at 837.
Although the trial court denied defendants' motion for summary
judgment on the first and second actions, it granted the motion on the
fourth cause of action. With regard to the third action concerning
mental anguish, the court granted defendants' motion for summary
judgment, but denied the motion as to the claim for incremental
medical expenses. Id. at 61, 432 A.2d at 837-38. Plaintiffs appealed
the summary judgment of the fourth action; however, the appellate
court affirmed. Id. Pla.'ntiffs further appealed the summary judgment
of the third action, and the appellate court reversed, although it also
reversed and granted summary judgment for defendants on the claim
for incremental medical costs. Id. at 61, 432 A.2d at 838. Defendants
did not appeal the reversal of the mental anguish action; however,
they did appeal the reversal of the medical costs action. Thus, the
issue before the supreme court was whether plaintiffs were entitled to
damages for the increased medical expense of raising Thomas. Id. at
62, 432 A.2d at 838.
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The supreme court's opinion analyzed the defendants' duties to
the parents, and whether the duty, if breached, was a proximate
cause of the harm. Id. at 62-63, 432 A.2d at 838. Defendants argued
that they had a duty only to their patient Ann and not to her parents.
The court quickly disposed of this defense stating that "defendant
physicians take too myopic a view of the responsibilities of a physician
treating a child with a genetically transferable disease such as cystic
fibrosis." Id. at 63, 432 A.2d at 838.
The court next considered whether there was a foreseeable effect
on the parents that flowed from the negligent diagnosis of Ann. Id.
The court reasoned that the nature of a parent-child relationship and
the responsibility of parents to provide medical care for their children
provided the foreseeability that a wrong to the child would result in
harm to the child's parents. Id. at 64, 432 A.2d at 839. The court
stated: "A family is woven of the fibers of life; if one strand is
damaged, the whole structure may suffer. The filaments of family
life, although individually spun, create a web of interconnected legal
interests." Id. at 63-64, 432 A.2d at 839.
The court acknowledged that in the present case, as in Berman v.
Allen, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979), which held that a separate
cause of action existed for parents against a negligent physician for the
emotional harm caused by their unknowingly giving birth to a child
afflicted with Down's syndrome, the parents have their own action
for additional medical expenses independent of any action their child
might or might not have. 87 N.J. at 66, 432 A.2d at 840. The court
concluded that the defendants' duty extended from the patient to the
immediate family; that defendants' failure to diagnose the parents as
carriers of cystic fibrosis was a breach of that duty; and that defendants' breach could foreseeably result in the parents' conceiving a
second child suffering from cystic fibrosis, thereby necessitating additional medical expenses. Id.
Focusing on the damages sought by plaintiffs for medical expenses, the court noted that generally damages are measured by the
total damages proximately caused by the harm. Id. Prior cases have
denied damages for the normal expenses of raising and supervising a
wrongfully born child because the courts found the measure of damages unascertainable. Id. at 67, 432 A.2d at 840-41. The instant case,
however, involved a claim for extraordinary medical expenses. The
court reasoned that damages for extraordinary medical expenses are
more proportionate to the harm done and more easily measured. Id.
at 68, 432 A.2d at 841. Thus, the court held that the incremental
medical costs incurred as a result of the cystic fibrosis of their son
Thomas is part of the parents' loss caused by the denial of their right
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to decide whether to give birth to a second child. Id. at 70, 432 A.2d
at 842. The court therefore remanded the matter for trial to determinewhether the defendants' deprived the plaintiffs of their right to
decide. Id. at 70-71, 432 A.2d at 842.
Justice Schreiber, basing his dissent on Chief Justice Weintraub's
dissenting opinion in Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689
(1967), wrote that the damages due a mother who has been denied an
informed decision of whether to conceive a child "flow[s] from the
emotional impact upon" realizing the denial of that choice. 87 N.J. at
71-72, 432 A.2d at 843 (Schreiber, J., dissenting). In no way does this
include damages for medical expenses. Id. Furthermore, the dissent
argued that since the medical expenses are for the child and since a
child has no basis for a cause of action for wrongful life or for medical
expenses, it stands to reason that the parents, too, should be denied
such a recovery. Id. at 71, 432 A.2d at 843 (Schreiber, J., dissenting).
The dissent would therefore affirm the summary judgment of the
medical expenses. Id. at 72, 432 A.2d at 843 (Schreiber, J., dissenting).
Justice Handler concurred with the majority decision concerning
recovery of damages for additional medical expenses, but dissented
from the majority decision because it failed to analyze the rights of the
wrongfully born child. Id. (Handler, J., concurring). He contended
that plaintiffs' fourth cause of action, namely the infant's claim for
damages which was denied by the appellate court, should also be
reversed. Id. at 74, 432 A.2d at 844 (Handler, J., concurring). He
urged that a child has a claim based on wrongful life or "impaired or
diminished childhood," a situation in which the child is born of
parents who are emotionally and mentally less capable of caring for
the child due to the physician's malpractice in denying them the
informed choice of whether or not to have the child, thereby effecting
the infant's quality of life. Id. at 73-74, 432 A.2d at 844 (Handler, J.,
concurring).
The majority opinion, cognizant of both the excessive financial
burden for the parents and the legal right of the parents to recover for
their wrongfully born handicapped child, rightly opens a new and
narrow area for the recovery of damages for medical malpractice.
Justice Handler, who wrote an opinion which went beyond the ambit
of the appeal, proposes an equally justifiable right of the wrongfully
born handicapped child. The court, confronted with the wrongful life
issue, must grapple with the comparison of life versus non-life and
with the calculation of elusive and complex damages. As Justice Handler properly states, "[w]e should not shrink from what is right." id.
at 77, 432 A.2d at 846 (Handler, J., concurring).
R.J.w.
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INFLUENCE-STRICTER STANDARD OF CLEAR AND CON-

VINCING EVIDENCE REQUIRED

To

REBUT PRaESUMPTION OF UNDUE

INFLUENCE ON TESTATRIX WHEN ATTORNEY INVOLVED IN CONFLICT

INTERET-Haynes v. First National State Bank, 87 N.J. 163,
432 A.2d 890 (1981).
OF

Isabel Dutrow, a multi-millionaire octogenarian, executed a will
prepared by her attorney. This testamentary disposition provided
equally for the families of her two daughters, Betty Haynes and
Dorcas Cotsworth. Subsequent to the death of her live-in daughter
Betty, Mrs. Dutrow, though suffering from such ailments as glaucoma, cateracts, diverticulitis, and a broken hip, voluntarily decided
to move in with and rely on her only surviving child, Dorcas. 87 N.J.
at 168-69, 432 A.2d at 893. A new will diminishing the Haynes
grandchildren's interest and drastically favoring Dorcas and her children was ultimately executed by the testatrix with the assistance and
advice of the Cotsworth family's attorney. Id.
The initial issue presented was whether the new will and two
related trusts were invalid on the ground of undue influence, as the
attorney for the testatrix was also the attorney for the principle beneficiary, in whom the testatrix reposed trust, confidence, and dependency. Id. at 167, 432 A.2d at 892. Upon examining the first issue, the
trial court held that the defendants had overcome the presumption of
undue influence. The appellate court affirmed. Id. Although concluding that the presumption of undue influence had been properly established, the supreme court rejected the lower courts' application of the
conventional evidentiary standard which requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence and remanded for further fact finding. Id. at
185-86, 432 A.2d at 902.
To raise a presumption of undue influence the contestant of a
will needs to demonstrate a confidential relationship and suspicious
circumstances. Id. at 176, 432 A.2d at 897. The court found that a
confidential relationship existed between the testatrix and beneficiary
because of the former's dependency on the latter for companionship,
care, and support. Id. The court also found that the relationship
between the attorney for the testatrix and the principle beneficiary,
coupled with the drastic change in the will, constituted suspicious
circumstances. Thus, the supreme court agreed with the trial court
that the proponents of the will had the burden of disproving undue
influence. Id. at 177, 432 A.2d at 897.
Generally, upon a finding that there exists a presumption of
undue influence, the proponent of a will is required to rebut the
presumption by merely a preponderance of evidence. Id. at 177-78,
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432 A.2d at 898. The court stated, however, that the stricter standard
of clear and convincing evidence was necessary in this case. After
noting that it has repeatedly emphasized that lawyers should owe
their "undivided loyalty . . . to no one but the testator," id. at 179,
432 A.2d at 899, the court commented that the attorney's behavior in
this case ignored the spirit, if not the letter, of the MODEL CODE OF
PaOFFSSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR5-105 (1979). 87 N.J. at 182-85, 432
A.2d at 900-02. The supreme court's decision to impose a stricter
standard of proof under such circumstances protects the actual intent
of testators, and is in accord with DR 5-105.
The second issue concerned the enforceability of a noncontestability clause in wills or trusts under New Jersey common law, since the
testatrix died before the effective date of the probate code (September

1, 1978), N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§ 3A:2A-32 (West Cum. Supp. 1981-1982),

which invalidates such clauses in wills. 87 N.J. at 167, 432 A.2d at
892. Despite indicating that the state's common law upholds such
clauses even when undue influence is alleged, the trial court declared
the clause unenforceable, following the policy adopted by the new
probate code. Id. at 186, 432 A.2d at 902. The appellate division
reversed the decision because the will was probated prior to the
statute's effective date; furthermore, trusts were not viewed as being
included under the statute. Id.
The supreme court refused to enforce the noncontestability
clause, concluding that the legislature had weighed the "important
social values" in enacting the statute which precludes the enforceability of such clauses in trusts as well as wills when probable cause exists
to challenge the instrument. Id. at 189, 432 A.2d at 904.
The dissent indicated that the legislature erroneously believed
that N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:2A-32 codified New Jersey case law on
noncontestability clauses. 87 N.J. at 190, 432 A.2d at 905. The controlling case law is actually contrary to the statute. Id. at 191, 432
A.2d at 905 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
R.P.W.

